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THE DEFECTIVE AND MATERIAL CONDITIONALS IN 
MATHEMATICS: DOES IT MATTER? 
In this paper we discuss the relative merits of two different ways of understanding 
conditional statements of the form ‘if p then q’. We demonstrate that there is no 
relationship between an ability to draw modus tollens deductions and having a 
material conditional understanding, as proposed by Durand-Guerrier (2003). 
Instead, we suggest that the so-called defective conditional understanding is 
widespread among high achieving mathematics students. We argue that, despite its 
name, adopting this understanding does not prevent students from drawing valid 
logical deductions, or from being successful in university-level mathematics 
examinations.
DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF “IF P THEN Q”
Logical implication is fundamental to mathematical proof, and thus of major concern 
to mathematics educators at all levels. However, it is well known that students find 
dealing with conditional statements – statements of the form ‘if p then q’ – to be 
counterintuitive and difficult (e.g. Hoyles & Küchemann, 2002). One possible reason 
for these difficulties arises from the different meanings that can be given to such 
statements. In this paper we focus on two such meanings, the so-called material 
conditional and defective conditional conceptions. 
In formal logic courses university students are taught the formal concept definition of 
implication which is captured by the truth table shown in Figure 1(a): ‘if p then q’ is 
true in all cases except where the antecedent (p) is true and the consequent (q) false. 
p q if p then q p q if p then q
T T T  T T T 
T F F  T F F 
F T T  F T I 
F F T  F F I 
       (a)  (b) 
Figure 1: The material (a) and defective (b) conditional truth tables (T denotes ‘true’, 
F denotes ‘false’ and ‘I’ denotes ‘irrelevant’). 
This understanding – known by logicians as the material conditional – leads to some 
oddities such as statements like “if 3 is even, then  is irrational” being logically true.  
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Quine (1966) noted that this understanding of the conditional is not generally used in 
day-to-day life. He wrote that “‘if p then q’ is commonly felt less as an affirmation of 
a conditional than as a conditional affirmation of the consequent” (p.12). Wason 
(1966) described this alternative understanding of the conditional – one focussed on 
its meaning as a conditional affirmation of the consequent – as the defective
conditional. Here the conditional is deemed to be irrelevant in the cases where p is 
false; the corresponding truth table is shown in Figure 1(b). Other researchers have 
used various other terms for this understanding, such as the ‘hypothetical conditional’ 
(Mitchell, 1962) or the ‘common understanding’ (Durand-Guerrier, 2003). 
Given these two different understandings of a conditional statement, an obvious and 
important question arises: which is most appropriate for the mathematics classroom? 
Typically one would expect that the most appropriate concept image for a student to 
have is one which matches the relevant concept definition (Tall & Vinner, 1981). But 
Hoyles & Küchemann (2002) disagreed, and directly answered the question in favour 
of the defective conditional: 
“We claim that when studying reasoning in school mathematics, the [defective 
conditional] is a more appropriate interpretation of logical implication than the [material 
conditional], since in school mathematics, students have to appreciate the consequence of 
an implication when the antecedent is taken to be true” (p. 196). 
Durand-Guerrier (2003) disagreed with Hoyles & Küchemann, and gave two 
arguments in support of her position. First, that a material conditional understanding 
would be required to understand definitions such as that of a diagonal matrix: 
An nn matrix [aij] is diagonal if and only if for every i from 1 to n, and every j from 1 to 
n, if i j then aij = 0.
The crucial case here is that of i = j; the material conditional “if i  j then aij = 0” is 
true in this case regardless of whether aij = 0 or aij  0, and so, as Durand-Guerrier 
pointed out, the definition accurately describes our concept image of a diagonal 
matrix (i.e. where entries are zero everywhere except the diagonal, where they may 
be either non-zero or zero). However, the same is true of the defective conditional: it 
is not false in the case i = j, but rather irrelevant. That is to say that when i = j, nothing 
can be concluded about aij from the defective conditional. Thus, in our view at least, 
a defective conditional interpretation of “if i  j then aij = 0” does seem to give a 
concept definition which matches the appropriate concept image of diagonal 
matrices: when i j we know that aij = 0, but when i = j we don’t know anything as the 
conditional is irrelevant. 
Durand-Guerrier’s (2003) second argument against Hoyles & Küchemann’s (2002) 
position was more complex, and related to the kinds of deductions that can be made 
using each type of conditional. From a material conditional two valid deductions are 
possible: modus ponens (deducing q from “if p then q” and p) and modus tollens 
(deducing p from “if p then q” and q). However, Durand-Guerrier suggested that 
the second of these can not be made from a defective conditional: 
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With [the defective conditional] understanding of implication, it is no more possible to 
interpret the Modus Tollens without using the contrapositive. Indeed, the Modus Tollens 
conclusion is that antecedent is false; if one accepts only implications with true 
antecedent, one must use the contrapositive and apply Modus Ponens to it. However, the 
equivalence between a conditional statement and the corresponding contrapositive 
requires material implication (p. 29). 
Essentially Durand-Guerrier suggested that the modus tollens deduction cannot be 
made using a defective conditional understanding. With the material conditional 
understanding two routes are open to reasoners: they may either simply know the 
modus tollens deduction and apply it directly, or they may convert the conditional 
into its contrapositive (i.e. convert ‘if p then q’ into ‘if q  then p’) and then apply 
modus ponens. Neither of these routes appear to be viable if you have a defective 
conditional understanding. 
However, it could be possible to make a modus tollens deduction via a third route, by 
using modus ponens and an informal contradiction argument. Suppose a reasoner is 
given the defective conditional “if p then q” and the statement q. They might 
suppose p, conclude q by modus ponens, notice that q contradicts the given statement 
q, and so conclude that their supposition p was incorrect, concluding p. This 
admittedly rather long chain of reasoning seems to be entirely accessible to someone 
who has a defective understanding of the original conditional. Nevertheless, it might 
well be the case that the length of this chain of deductions hinders students from 
accurately making the modus tollens deduction, in which case we might agree with 
Durand-Guerrier’s (2003) arguments against Hoyles & Küchemann (2002).
In this paper we report data from an experiment which directly investigated of 
whether having a defective conditional conception hinders making logical deductions 
and, in particular, making modus tollens deductions. 
METHOD
The data reported in this paper come from a wider study which investigated the 
development of logical reasoning skills across the first year of undergraduate 
mathematics study. Participants were 33 first-year undergraduate students studying 
mathematics (either mathematics, or a joint degree with a significant mathematics 
component) at a highly-ranked UK university. All the students had been highly 
successful during their school mathematics studies: other than the two overseas 
students in the sample, all participants had been awarded A grades in both A Level 
Mathematics and A Level Further Mathematics (this represents the highest possible 
achievement in mathematics for 18 year-old school leavers in England and Wales). 
Students participated in two sessions of data collection during the course of their first 
year studies, once at the very beginning and once at the end. In both sessions 
participants worked individually through a booklet of tasks, all designed to 
interrogate logical reasoning behaviour. In this paper we report responses to the two 
tasks relevant to the debate between Hoyles & Küchemann (2002) and Durand-
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Guerrier (2003): the conditional inference task, and the truth table task. In each case 
we used abstract versions of the tasks to avoid the well-documented confounding 
effects of realistic/mathematical content (e.g. Stylianides, Stylianides, & Philippou, 
2004).
Conditional Inference Task 
The conditional inference task used was identical to that used by Inglis & Simpson 
(2008). In both sessions participants were given 32 problems of the form: 
This problem concerns an imaginary letter-number pair. Your task is to decide whether 
or not the conclusion necessarily follows from the rule and the premise. 
Rule: If the letter is not G then the number is 6. 
Premise: The number is not 6. 
Conclusion: The letter is G. 
 YES (it follows)  NO (it does not follow) 
The inferences tested were balanced: half were valid – modus ponens and modus 
tollens – and half were invalid – denial of the antecedent (concluding q from p
and ‘if p then q’) and affirmation of the consequent (concluding p from q and ‘if p
then q’). Following Inglis & Simpson (2008), the presence of negated statements in 
the rules were rotated (e.g. the rules of the form ‘if p then q’, ‘if p then q’ and ‘if 
p then q’ were used in addition to ‘if p then q’), and half of negated statements 
were represented explicitly (e.g. “not 3”) and half implicitly (e.g. “8” rather than “not 
3”). Participants took the task twice, once at the beginning of the year and once at the 
end, thus ended up with a score out of 64 together with subscores for each of the four 
tested inferences. These profiles gave an identification of how fluent participants 
were at drawing each of the four inferences tested, and of overall inferential fluency. 
Truth Table Task 
In the second session of data collection we also collected participants’ responses to 
32 tasks of the following form (adapted from earlier studies, Evans & Over, 2004): 
This problem relates to a card which has a capital letter on the left and a single-digit 
number on the right. You will be given a rule together with a picture of a card to which 
the rule applies. Your task is to determine whether the card conforms to the rule, 
contradicts the rule, or is irrelevant to the rule.
Rule: If the letter is not E then the number is not 1. 
Card: D1  
 card conforms to the rule  card contradicts the rule  card is irrelevant to the rule
Two cards representing each of the four lines of a truth table (Figure 1) were 
included, and the positions of negated statements in the conditionals were rotated. 
Each participant’s responses were scored twice: first, with respect to how consistent 
they were with the material conditional, and second, with respect to how consistent 
they were with the defective conditional. Thus each individual ended up with a 
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material conditional profile score (out of 32) and a defective conditional profile score 
(out of 32). The higher the profile score the more consistently the participant was 
using that understanding of the conditional. 
To provide a means of controlling for general cognitive skills, during the first session 
of data collection participants took Part 1 of the AH5 intelligence test (Heim, 1968). 
This test, designed for high achieving adults, contained 36 items in the categories 
‘directions’, ‘verbal analogies’, ‘numerical series’, and ‘similar relationships’. It has 
been widely used by other researchers interested in individual differences in logical 
reasoning abilities (e.g. Newstead et al., 2004). 
RESULTS
Our primary goal was to determine whether having a defective conditional 
understanding hinders inference-making, and in particular, making the modus tollens 
inference. To address this issue we calculated participants’ defective and material 
conditional profiles on the truth table task (i.e. the number of cards classified 
according to each conception). Twelve participants consistently adopted the defective 
conditional understanding (i.e. all their responses were in line with Figure 1(b)). In 
contrast no participant consistently adopted the material conditional understanding. 
The two difference conditional profile scores were correlated with the number of 
each inference correctly classified on the conditional inference task. If Durand-
Guerrier’s (2003) suggestion that a material conditional is required to make the 
modus tollens deduction we would expect a negative correlation between the 
defective conditional profiles and modus tollens scores. If, on the other hand, Hoyles 
& Küchemann’s (2002) suggestion that the defective conditional is “more 
appropriate” for the mathematics classroom, we might expect positive correlations 
between defective conditional profiles and each of the inference scores. The various 
correlations between each of the key indicators are shown in Table 1. 
 Def Mat MP DA AC MT All 
Def 1 -.54** .48** .68** .60** .03 .63** 
Mat -.54** 1 -.22 -.57** -.34 .12 -.39* 
 Table 1: Pearson correlations between the Defective (Def) and Material (Mat) profile 
scores, and the number of each inference correctly categorised (respectively modus 
ponens, denial of the antecedent, affirmation of the consequent and modus tollens). 
Significant correlations are denoted by *p<.05 and **p<.01.
Participants’ defective conditional profiles were strongly positively correlated with 
performance on the modus ponens, denial of the antecedent and affirmation of the 
consequent inferences (all at p < .01), i.e. those with a higher defective conditional 
profile score tended to classify MP, DA and AC inferences more accurately. 
However, there was no significant relationship with the modus tollens deduction. The 
material conditional profiles were negatively correlated with performance on the 
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denial of the antecedent inference, and overall inferential performance.  That is, 
participants with a higher material conditional profile tended, overall, to be more 
inaccurate on the conditional inference task. There was, however, no relationship 
between material conditional profiles and accuracy at classifying the modus tollens 
deduction. 
Further analyses revealed a significant positive correlation between defective 
conditional profiles and AH5 intelligence scores (r = .40, p = .021), but no 
relationship between material conditional profiles and AH5 scores (r = -.03, p = .86). 
As well as being related to defective conditional profile scores, AH5 scores were 
found to be borderline significantly related to overall deductive competence on the 
conditional inference task (r = .33, p = .063). Consequently, it may have been the 
case that participants’ AH5 scores represented a potential confound. That is to say 
that any relationship between the different interpretations of “if p then q” and 
deductive competence merely reflected mutual relationships with intelligence. To test 
for this possibility we repeated the correlation analyses, this time controlling for AH5 
scores. The resulting partial correlations are shown in Table 2.
 Def Mat MP DA AC MT All 
Def 1 -.57** .42* .62*** .53** .10 .58** 
Mat -.57** 1 -.21 -.60*** -.35* .12 -.40* 
 Table 2: Partial correlations between Defective (Def) and Material (Mat) profile 
scores and the number of each inference correctly categorised, controlling for AH5 
scores. Significant correlations are denoted by *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.
After controlling for AH5 scores, essentially the same pattern of correlations 
emerged. Participants with high defective conditional profile scores tended to be 
more proficient at accurately categorising (as valid or invalid) modus ponens, denial 
of the antecedent and affirmation of the consequent deductions. Those with high 
material conditional profile scores tended to categorise fewer deductions correctly. 
There was, however, no relationship between either of the two conditional profile 
scores and the number of MT deductions correctly assigned. This was not because of 
a floor effect; participants were able to tackle the MT component of the task. 
Performance on this section was respectable, with a mean of 10.3 inferences correctly 
categorised (out of 16; SD = 3.0). 
DISCUSSION 
Recall that Durand-Guerrier (2003) argued that the material conditional was 
necessary to make the modus tollens deduction. Our results call this assertion into 
question. We found no relationship between accurately categorising modus tollens 
deductions and the interpretation of “if p then q” participants adopted. However, 
having a defective interpretation – where “if p then q” is deemed irrelevant when p is 
false – was associated with higher scores on every other measure of deductive 
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competence we took (the valid/invalid categorisation of modus ponens, denial of the 
antecedent and affirmation of the consequent deductions), and with higher AH5 
scores. Given this, if our data supports one interpretation of “if p then q” over the 
other, it would seem to be the defective conditional ahead of the material conditional. 
It is somewhat surprising that defective conditional profile scores were correlated 
with every deductive competence measure apart from that relating to modus tollens. 
One possible explanation for this relates to the “informal contradiction argument” 
route to making modus tollens deductions discussed earlier. This involves rather a 
long chain of reasoning, so it seems reasonable to propose that the success or failure 
of such a chain might be more related to factors such as the concentration or 
motivation levels of the participant rather than would be the case for the modus 
ponens, denial of the antecedent or affirmation of the consequent deductions. Further 
investigations would be required to determine exactly which factors influence success 
or failure at making modus tollens deductions.  
Some caution is needed in the interpretation of these results, due to the relatively 
small number of participants who adopted the material conditional. As noted above, 
no participant did so consistently, and indeed all but two of the participants had 
higher defective conditional profiles than they did material conditional profiles. This 
observation suggests that the defective conditional understanding of the conditional is 
adopted by the majority of high-attaining mathematics undergraduates, and that it 
does not prevent them from being relatively successful at drawing logical deductions. 
This consideration also suggests a reason for why we found positive correlations 
between having a defective conditional understanding and performance on the modus 
ponens, denial of the antecedent and affirmation of the consequent inferences. If the 
large majority of participants adopted a defective understanding, then those with 
lower defective conditional profile scores (and hence probably higher material 
conditional profile scores) would be those participants who found it difficult to apply 
their understanding consistently across the task. If this interpretation were correct we 
might expect a correlation between defective profile and AH5 scores (which, indeed, 
was the case, r = .40, p = .021). Under these assumptions, the defective conditional 
profile score could be interpreted as a measure of consistency throughout the task. 
It is possible that the participants in this study were atypical of university level 
mathematics students, and that their near uniform adoption of the defective 
conditional understanding of the conditional did harm their mathematics 
achievement. To test for this possibility we obtained each participant’s first year 
examination marks for the four core mathematics modules taken by each student. 
Although there was no correlation between students’ average marks and their 
material or defective conditional profile scores (rs = 0.04, 0.09 respectively), the 
group as a whole had very high levels of achievement. The mean first-year 
examination mark obtained by the sample was 76% (SD=12%), well above the 70% 
threshold for the top grade. 
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CONCLUSION
Hoyles & Küchemann (2002) suggested that the defective conditional was the most 
appropriate to develop in the mathematics classroom, as it allows students to 
appreciate “the consequence of an implication when the antecedent is taken to be 
true”. Durand-Guerrier (2003) disagreed with Hoyles & Küchemann, by suggesting 
that the material conditional was necessary in order to be able to make modus tollens 
deductions. In this paper we have empirically demonstrated that there is no 
connection between having a material conditional understanding and making modus 
tollens deductions. Furthermore, we have shown that high achieving mathematics 
undergraduates almost uniformly adopt the defective conditional understanding, and 
that this does not seem to adversely affect either their ability to draw inferences from 
abstract conditional statements, or their performance on university mathematics 
examinations. In sum, mathematically, there appears to be no disadvantage to holding 
a defective understanding of the conditional. 
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